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Abstract
Facemasks are part of the hierarchy of interventions used to reduce the transmission of respiratory 
pathogens by providing a barrier. Two types of facemasks used by healthcare workers are N95 
filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs). These can become contaminated 
with respiratory pathogens during use, thus serving as potential sources for transmission. 
However, because of the lack of field studies, the hazard associated with pathogen-exposed 
facemasks is unknown. A mathematical model was used to calculate the potential influenza 
contamination of facemasks from aerosol sources in various exposure scenarios. The aerosol 
model was validated with data from previous laboratory studies using facemasks mounted on 
headforms in a simulated healthcare room. The model was then used to estimate facemask 
contamination levels in three scenarios generated with input parameters from the literature. A 
second model estimated facemask contamination from a cough. It was determined that 
contamination levels from a single cough (≈19 viruses) were much less than likely levels from 
aerosols (4,473 viruses on FFRs and 3,476 viruses on SMs). For aerosol contamination, a range of 
input values from the literature resulted in wide variation in estimated facemask contamination 
levels (13–202,549 viruses), depending on the values selected. Overall, these models and 
estimates for facemask contamination levels can be used to inform infection control practice and 
research related to the development of better facemasks, to characterize airborne contamination 
levels, and to assist in assessment of risk from reaerosolization and fomite transfer because of 
handling and reuse of contaminated facemasks.
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Facemasks, including National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)-
certified N95 filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs), are 
nonpharmaceutical interventions used to reduce the transmission of respiratory pathogens. 
The designed and intended uses of FFRs and SMs differ in the types of protection provided. 
FFRs are typically composed of electret filter media and seal tightly to the face of the 
wearer, whereas SMs are generally loose fitting and may or may not contain electret filtering 
media. FFRs are designed and worn to reduce the wearer’s inhalation exposure to infectious 
particles. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends that health-
care workers (HCWs) use fit-tested FFRs when in close contact with patients infected with a 
respiratory pathogen that spreads via aerosol transmission, such as Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis.(1) Similar recommendations have been made for respiratory pathogen 
outbreaks, such as the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, in which aerosol transmission was 
considered likely.(2,3) SMs reduce contamination of the environment from particles 
generated by the wearer and provide a barrier to protect HCWs from splashes and sprays of 
body fluids such as blood. Both FFRs and SMs restrict users from touching their mouth and 
nose, which limits opportunities for contact transmission of respiratory pathogens from the 
hands to the mucosa of the wearer. Studies in various workplaces have demonstrated that fit-
tested FFRs, when used in a complete respiratory protection program, are effective at 
reducing inhalation exposures,(4–9) whereas SMs are far less effective for this purpose 
because of their poorer fit and filtration performance.(10–12) Laboratory studies have 
demonstrated the superior filter performance of FFRs over SMs by using various simulants 
for respiratory pathogens.(13–16)
As with many other interventions (such as hand washing and vaccination), the effectiveness 
of FFRs at reducing human-to-human transmission of respiratory pathogens is ultimately 
governed by compliance. Adherence to proper FFR use practices requires careful attention 
to all elements of a respiratory protection program, including training, fit-testing, and proper 
donning/doffing technique. Previous study findings on HCW adherence to proper respirator 
use suggest that compliance is often lacking.(17–19) Another challenge with FFRs is that 
proper technique is required to put them on and take them off. Poor doffing techniques can 
lead to the transfer of infectious material to the user’s hands.(20) Concerns about 
contaminated FFRs contributing to disease transmission (e.g., as fomites) are fairly unique 
to healthcare and emergency response settings, in which the respirator is used to reduce 
exposures to an infectious aerosol that can also cause infection via contact transmission. 
Most particulate hazards, common to other occupational sectors where FFRs are used, such 
as machine shops, construction sites, and other industrial facilities, are noninfectious 
inhalation hazards.
Even within healthcare, the risks of handling a contaminated FFR are complex. Unlike most 
other medical and personal protective devices, FFR and SM contamination is affected by the 
user’s breathing, which causes nearby particles in the air to come in contact with the 
facemask. For most noninvasive medical devices (such as stethoscopes) and other types of 
nonrespiratory personal protective equipment (gloves, lab coats, and eyewear), 
contamination occurs via contact, direct sprays or splashes (from a cough or sneeze, for 
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example), and settling forces. The electret filter medium used in an FFR consists of several 
layers of air-permeable nonwoven fibers. Thus, contamination occurs not only at the surface 
of the FFR but also throughout the depths of the fiber bed within each layer. Laboratory 
studies that have evaluated layer-by-layer deposition have found that aerosolized virus is 
mainly deposited in the middle layers, but deposition also depends on the size and 
composition of the aerosol.(10,21)
To address concerns raised by HCWs and to improve compliance with proper respirator use, 
NIOSH, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and other researchers have proposed 
developing a “B95” respirator specific for HCWs, as part of project BREATHE (Better 
Respiratory Equipment using Advanced Technologies for Healthcare Employees).(22) The 
first draft of the requirements for a proposed B95 respirator describes 28 characteristics, 
including several that focus on the desire to minimize transfer of infectious respiratory 
pathogens from a contaminated respirator to the hands of the wearer. The authors of that 
report recognized that no respirator on the market today could meet all 28 requirements, and 
thus prioritization would enable technologists and manufacturers to focus on those 
characteristics that impact HCWs the most. Unfortunately, few data on FFR contamination 
are available to assist with such prioritization. For example, if actual FFR contamination 
levels are small enough that transfer to the mucosa of the wearer is unlikely (that is, if FFRs 
are not an important fomite concern), then this would suggest that these characteristics 
should be given lower priority than other characteristics such as fit and comfort.
There are other applications for which information about facemask contamination levels are 
important. For example, FFR reuse and extended use have been proposed as possible ways 
to maintain respirator supplies during a pandemic.(23,24) With the current threat of the newly 
identified influenza H7N9 in China,(25,26) concerns over facemask availability, particularly 
FFRs, have again come to the forefront of pandemic preparedness planning. FFR reuse 
would allow the HCW to don and doff the same FFR multiple times, and extended use 
would allow a HCW to wear one FFR for encounters with multiple patients. One possible 
FFR reuse strategy that has been studied extensively is to employ a biological 
decontamination method to kill or inactivate trapped respiratory pathogens.(21,27–35) To 
accurately characterize the risks of FFR reuse and extended use and to develop test methods 
to quantify decontamination performance, FFR contamination levels need to be estimated or 
measured. In the absence of this information, other considerations are used. For example, 
ASTM test methods E2720-10 and E2721-10 set FFR contamination level targets based 
upon the detection limits of the assay, rather than on the likelihood that these FFR 
contamination levels are possible.(36,37) FFR contamination levels are critical to 
understanding the threat of reaerosolization of infectious particles from an FFR. Fisher et al. 
found that the percentage of viruses reaerosolized was dependent upon the type and amount 
of FFR contamination.(38) The authors based their experiments on the detection limits of the 
assay, similar to ASTM methods E2720 and E2721.
Surprisingly few experimental data on facemask contamination levels are available from 
hospital settings, despite the increase in facemask research. In many situations for which 
there are no experimental data, models can be used. For example, a population transmission 
model has been used to explore the impact of population-wide facemask use,(39) and other 
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studies have evaluated models describing influenza transmission, effectiveness of 
interventions, and risk.(40–46)
In our study, the mathematical model used previously by Fisher et al. for assessing risks 
because of reaerosolization of viruses was used to calculate the potential influenza 
contamination of facemasks from aerosol sources for a variety of healthcare settings.(38) The 
aerosol model was validated with previously collected data from laboratory studies in which 
face-masks were mounted on headforms in a simulated healthcare room. The model was 
then used to estimate facemask contamination levels for three scenarios generated with input 
parameters derived from the literature. A second model is also presented, which estimates 
facemask contamination from direct-spray sources. Results from the two models are 
compared.
2. METHODS
2.1. Literature Search Strategy for Model Inputs
We searched via PubMed and Google Scholar for publications on the major topic headings: 
aerosol and influenza and qPCR (quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction); aerosol 
and influenza and concentration; duration of provider-patient interaction; duration of 
physician-patient interaction; duration of nurse–patient interaction; workplace protection 
factor (WPF); breathing rate; and HCW breathing rate. References were obtained and 
reviewed for relevance. Because not all relevant publications are available through the 
chosen publication databases, references cited within relevant manuscripts were also 
reviewed for relevance and selected for additional scrutiny as necessary. Similarly, technical 
specifications and test standard documents relevant to facemasks were also considered.
2.2. Facemask Contamination Models
In this work, two models were used to estimate facemask contamination. These models 
consider contamination only via deposition of aerosols or direct sprays (such as cough) that 
come in contact with the facemask; they do not consider other sources of contamination, 
such as any virus that gets transferred to the facemask from the hands. A list of parameters 
for the model equations is provided in Table I. Equation (1) is the model used to estimate 
facemask contamination from aerosols (Cfa). This model calculates Cfa from airborne 
influenza virus concentration (Cout, virus/m3) and facemask use factors such as facemask 
user inhalation rate (IRa, m3/hour), duration (t, hour) of facemask use (length of patient 
interaction), and facemask virus barrier efficiency (Eb):
(1)
Eb is the ratio of virus in the inspiratory volume of air that is captured by the facemask and 
can be determined by using Equation (2), where Cin is the concentration of virus inside the 
facemask and Cout is the concentration of virus outside the facemask in the breathing zone 
of the wearer:
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Equation (3) is the model for estimating face-mask contamination (Cfc) via direct spray 
produced by a cough:
(3)
In this model, Vc is the number of viruses in a cough, Afm is the area of a facemask, and Ac 
is the area of the cough at the distance between the cougher and the HCW. This equation 
was adapted from a risk analysis by Nicas and Jones.(43)
2.3. Facemask Contamination Model Validation
The aerosol model (Equation (1)) was validated with use of a 795-ft3 simulated patient 
examination room. A detailed description of the simulated patient room can be found 
elsewhere.(10) A total of nine data points were used to validate Equation (1). Four of the data 
points were derived from the results reported by Noti et al.(10) The other five data points 
were collected as part of experiments designed to investigate the effect of influenza aerosol 
concentration on facemask contamination, which is the subject of a separate manuscript in 
preparation (J. D. Noti, personal communication). For completeness, a short description will 
be given here. A coughing simulator was used to expel H1N1 influenza strain A/WS/33 into 
the 3.2 m × 3.2 m × 2.3 m chamber. Virus aerosol concentration was measured beside the 
mouth and inside of the facemask of a breathing headform with a previously described 
NIOSH aerosol sampler and used in Equations (1) and (2) for Cout and Cin, 
respectively.(47–49) The breathing headform, positioned 2 m away from the coughing 
simulator, was attached to a breathing simulator and maintained at a rate (IRa) of 1.92 m3/
hour. The breathing headform was fitted with an FFR or SM in sealed and unsealed 
configurations. An FFR or SM was attached to the headform using a silicone sealant or 
fitted on the headform using the tethering straps of the facemask to provide both sealed and 
unsealed conditions, respectively.(10) The Eb of the facemasks was determined for SMs and 
FFRs in sealed and unsealed conditions using Equation (2). Table II lists the input values for 
the variables in Equation (1) used to calculate Cfa. Virus captured by the facemask was 
recovered from 5 cm2 coupons excised from the FFR or SM and quantitated by qPCR. 
Given the coupon sampled was 5 cm2 of an approximate 200 cm2 face-mask, the number of 
viruses detected on the coupon by qPCR was multiplied by 40 to give a total number of 
viruses on the facemask assuming equal deposition of virus across the surface of the 
facemask. This value was compared to the predicted value. Unfortunately, no data are 
available to validate the model described in Equation (2) to estimate FFR contamination by 
a direct spray from cough or sneeze.
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2.4. Experimental Design: Application of the Models
To better understand how the input parameters affect estimated facemask contamination 
levels, Equation (1) was applied for three scenarios (termed “low,” “high,” and “likely”) 
designed to span the gamut of situations that a facemask would be used in a typical 
healthcare setting. These calculations were done for both an FFR and an SM. Published data 
were used to obtain low, high, and likely values for Cout, IRa, Eb, and t. Another calculation 
was performed using Equation (3) to estimate Cfc. The input variable Vc was chosen from 
data found in the peer-reviewed literature,(50) whereas Afm was estimated from area 
measurements of facemasks in our laboratory supplies and the value selected for Ac was 
based upon previous work by Nicas and Jones.(43) Because of the paucity of data available 
related to these input variables, Equation (3) was applied for only a single scenario with use 
of likely values.
2.5. Data Analysis
A statistical comparison of the laboratory-measured contamination and the estimated FFR 
contamination was performed with a two-tailed t-test (Microsoft Excel 2010). The 




The PubMed and Google Scholar searches for the major topic headings resulted in 151 
citations for peer-reviewed articles. The 151 references were perused for relevant data, 
preferably from healthcare settings, for the model inputs. Of the 151 references retrieved, 18 
provided potential values for the inputs to our models. All potential input data were 
evaluated to assign low, high, and likely values. Two additional relevant sources were 
obtained by reviewing references of the original 18 manuscripts. One of these, ISO/TS 
16976-1, a technical specification that provides respiratory and metabolic values intended 
for the preparation of standards for performance requirements, testing, and use of respiratory 
protective devices, provided the values for inhalation rates. The references used as inputs to 
the models to calculate Cfa and Cfc are summarized in Table III.
3.2. Model-Predicted Facemask Contamination for Various Scenarios
Fig. 1 and Table II show the comparison of the predicted and measured facemask 
contamination values for the validation experiments demonstrated significant (p < 0.05) 
correlation (R2 = 0.95).
Predicted facemask contamination levels from the low, high, and likely simulated aerosol 
and likely direct spray scenarios based on inputs from the literature can be found in Table IV 
and Table V, respectively. For the simulated aerosol contamination scenarios, estimated 
facemask contamination ranged from 19 to 202,549 viruses and from 13 to 182,477 viruses 
for FFRs and SMs, respectively. The Cout, IRa, and t values were the same for both the SM 
and FFR contamination calculations, whereas values for Eb were different between the FFR 
and SM scenarios.
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Contamination by droplet spray produced by a direct cough would lead to 19 viruses 
becoming trapped on the FFR, given a distance of 0.6 m, a concentration of 355 virus/cough, 
a particle spread of 3,800 cm2, and an FFR area of 200 cm2. On the basis of assumed equal 
sizes (Afm) for the SM and the FFR, the cough contamination for an SM would be the same 
value as for the FFR.
4. DISCUSSION
There are numerous situations, in particular healthcare settings, where information regarding 
facemask contamination levels is necessary. In the absence of experimental data, ideally 
collected from actual workplaces, models can serve a useful purpose if properly validated 
(where possible) and if assumptions are clearly disclosed. In this study, two models were 
described to estimate facemask contamination from aerosol and direct-spray (cough) 
sources. These models were then applied to calculate potential face-mask contamination 
levels in various scenarios representing typical HCW use. We chose to focus on influenza as 
a target respiratory pathogen because of continued concerns about newly emerging influenza 
strains (H5N1, H7N9, etc.) and the lack of aerosol data for other respiratory pathogens.
Laboratory data from a simulated patient room were used to validate Equation (1) (see Table 
II and Fig. 1). The slope of the linear equation of the best fit line is close to 1; however, 
many factors could account for the deviation. Cfa is directly proportional to Cout, IRa, Er, and 
t. Cout and Eb, although measured during laboratory experiments, are input values that may 
fluctuate during experimentation. Virus aerosol concentration varies over time and across 
the volume of a room. Although the Cout was measured with aerosol samplers placed right 
beside the headform, it is expected that the Cout directly exposed to the mask is not 
equivalent to the measured Cout, as the model assumes because of the spatial variability of 
virus concentration.(10) For the laboratory data, Eb are subject to the spatial variations of 
both Cin and Cout in Equation (2). Recovery and detection of viruses from facemasks are not 
100% efficient. Loss of virus during experimental procedures was not considered when 
applying the laboratory determined input values into Equation (1); therefore, it is expected 
that the model predicted Cfa would be greater than the laboratory measured Cfa.
Facemask contamination was determined with use of FFRs and SMs in sealed and unsealed 
configurations exposed to various concentrations of aerosols; therefore, the model was 
validated with a range of values for two of the model inputs (Cout and Eb). The other two 
variables for the aerosol equation, breathing rate (IRa) and patient interaction time (t), 
remained unchanged during facemask contamination experiments, and thus the effects of 
these variables were not determined. However, the product of breathing rate (m3/hour) and 
patient interaction/facemask use (hour) is volume (m3). An increase in aerosol volume 
passing through respirator samples has been shown in previous work to increase respirator 
contamination in a small test chamber.(21) This is consistent with the aerosol model 
(Equation (1)), where facemask contamination is directly proportional to each variable.
In application of the aerosol contamination model (Equation (1)) to the three different 
scenarios, the estimated influenza contamination of an FFR ranged from approximately 19 
to 202,549 viruses, whereas the SM contamination ranged from 13 to 182,477 viruses. On 
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the basis of the most realistic set of input parameters to simulate a typical situation (scenario 
#3), the aerosol model suggests that an FFR would become contaminated with 
approximately 3,482 viruses, whereas an SM would contain approximately 2,744 viruses 
when used by a HCW with direct patient care during flu season. Simulations using the 
cough model (Equation (2)) suggest that direct spray via coughs (19 viruses) may not cause 
high levels of contamination, a finding suggesting that aerosol contamination is the most 
likely source of facemask contamination.
The input level for airborne influenza virus concentration had the largest impact on Cfa. The 
likely virus aerosol concentration used for the input was 12,000 viruses/m3, which is the 
number of viruses detected by Lindsley et al.(49) Yang et al. detected 16,000 viruses/m3, the 
high value input, in a health-care facility and reported similar results for child-care facilities 
and planes.(51) They also reported a concentration of 37,000 viruses/m3 for a childcare 
facility; however, this value was not used as an input because childcare facilities do not have 
the ventilation requirements of hospitals. Tseng et al. measured influenza concentrations in a 
pediatric emergency room during flu season.(52) The lowest level of virus detected was 168 
viruses/m3. It should be noted that those researchers reported a significant correlation 
between patients with lower respiratory infections and influenza A counts. There were 
approximately seven patients with lower respiratory infections in the emergency room when 
the value of 168 viruses/m3 was measured. All Cout values were obtained by collecting 
aerosol samples in emergency departments. Because the Cout inputs were reported as 
concentrations, sampling time differences among the references can be ignored.
Among the four variables in the model, Cout is the most sensitive to the user’s specific 
workplace environment. For example, aerosol-generating procedures (such as bronchoscopy, 
intubation, ventilation, and nebulization) and source control (SM placement on the patient, 
bedside air filters, etc.) have the potential to significantly increase or decrease levels of 
airborne respiratory pathogens, respectively.(15,53–57) Thompson et al. reported that 
bronchoscopies produced exceedingly high levels (284,875 viruses/L) of detected 
influenza.(53) If the value given for Cout produced during a bronchoscopy were used in 
Equation (1), with all other variables kept at their likely level, the estimated FFR 
contamination would be over 100 million viruses, which is much higher than in any of the 
typical scenarios modeled in Table IV. Milton et al. determined that the use of SMs on 
patients (source control) produced 25-fold and 2.8-fold reductions in the detected influenza 
RNA copy number for coarse and fine particles, respectively.(57) Using a conservative 
estimate of a 2× reduction in Cout because of masking patients would result in a significant 
reduction to the estimated facemask contamination level. However, additional research is 
needed before we can confidently apply the models for these scenarios.
The input level for duration of facemask wear had the second largest impact on Cfa. For our 
simulations, we estimated the most likely duration of patient interaction to be 20 minutes, 
which is supported by multiple literature sources.(58,59) However, the high-value-input 
scenario (6.6 hours) is unlikely in practice. An extended length of time of respirator wear is 
not consistent with the requirements that FFRs be discarded after each patient encounter, 
except for cases of tuberculosis, where reuse is permitted.(3) Most HCWs need to take 
breaks during the day, and there are very few situations where more than two hours of 
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continuous wear is likely to occur. The input value we selected for patient interaction in this 
scenario, 6.6 hours, was based on the findings of Radonovich et al. In their study, the 
purpose was to determine the maximum time a HCW could tolerate an FFR in the event that 
extended use was required to maintain FFR supplies in periods of high demand.(60) The 
value 6.6 was chosen because this was the maximum time that HCWs were able to tolerate 
an N95 FFR. During this experiment, the HCWs were permitted breaks in which they doffed 
their FFRs for 15–30 minutes, which would further reduce t.
The input level for inhalation rate had only a small impact on Cfa. The inputs for IRa were 
selected from ISO/TS 16976-1. This document is intended for the preparation of standards 
for performance requirements, testing, and use of respiratory protective devices and provides 
respiratory responses for various metabolic rates associated with mainly industrial activities, 
as defined in ISO8996. The inputs for IRa were based on individuals at rest and with light 
and moderate metabolic rates, which correspond to low, likely, and high input values for the 
model. The low IRa is associated with sedentary work, typical of office settings. The likely 
IRa value is associated with activities of laboratory assistants and teachers, who (like HCWs) 
are often standing for long periods of time. The high-value IRa input is associated with the 
activities of craftsmen such as brick layers and carpenters but could be achieved by HCWs 
during activities such as patient lifting. The IRa values used in the model are based on a 
person with a weight of 85 kg, which may be higher than the mean weight of the HCW 
population. Lower IRa values were reported in the literature for sleeping or resting and 
therefore were not included in the estimate.
The relatively small range of input values for facemask barrier efficiency used in Table III 
caused this variable to have the least change in estimated Cfa. As expected, the simulations 
using the aerosol model predict that FFRs capture more viruses than SMs because they 
provide a tighter seal around the face and contain filter media with higher levels of filtration 
performance. Although the relative difference between the highest value and low value 
inputs is minimal, this variable was the most difficult for which to find useful input values. 
The input values selected for the simulation required careful assumptions, and there are no 
published data on Eb from actual healthcare settings or that have Cin data (i.e., virus 
concentrations inside the facemask) that can be used directly in Equation (2). Instead, we 
selected N95 FFR-specific WPF data from other workplace settings for the FFR simulations 
and laboratory data with human test subjects for the SM simulations. The most likely Eb for 
FFRs was determined by calculating the median WPF across all of the reported geometric 
mean WPF values in each study.(5–9,61) The low value was based on OSHA’s minimum 
required assigned protection factor of 10 for N95 FFRs. The high value input for Eb was 
determined from the highest WPF (9,100) measured for an FFR wearer in a grinding 
operation.(9) All Eb values for SMs were selected from a study by Oberg and Brosseau, who 
assessed SM performance using quantitative fit tests.(11) The average overall fit factor (FF) 
for SMs donned without assistance represented the most likely Eb of a SM for the model. 
The low and high values represent the worst and best FFs reported in the Oberg and 
Brosseau study. A modified version of Equation (2) was used to convert the reported WPF 
and FF values to Eb (e.g., ). The likely Eb values selected for FFRs and SMs 
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were 0.991 and 0.77, respectively, which represent a WPF = 120 and an average FF of 4.4, 
respectively.
The aerosol and cough models have a variety of potential uses.
• Manufacturers and researchers can use the model to develop better facemasks. 
Recently, there has been an interest in developing technologies to mediate the 
fomite hazards of face-masks used in healthcare facilities. The requirement to 
incorporate such technologies in future standards (for example, Project 
BREATHE’s B95 standard) is being debated. Research has been conducted on 
facemasks with integrated antimicrobial technology, and the FDA has cleared a few 
antimicrobial FFRs.(16,62,63) Research has also examined the efficacy of chemical 
and energetic methods to decontaminate FFRs. Both integrated antimicrobial 
technologies and decontamination methods can be tested with use of ASTM 
E2720-10 and E2721-10, which are aerosol- and droplet-based methods, 
respectively, designed for use with air-permeable materials such as facemasks. To 
allow for demonstration of a 3-log10TCID50 efficacy in the reduction of viral 
contamination, these methods require a viral challenge of 4-log10TCID50/cm on the 
facemask samples. This is equivalent to 200,000 TCID50 on the facemask, which is 
highly unlikely in typical situations, as determined by the models. Using models to 
predict facemask contamination would allow manufacturers and researchers to 
better assess the efficacy and/or cost effectiveness of antimicrobial, chemical, and 
energetic technologies for facemask decontamination in hospital settings.
• Policymakers can use the models to better understand reaerosolization and fomite 
hazards resulting from the reuse of influenza-contaminated facemasks. As an 
example, during the H1N1 pandemic of 2009, FFR reuse and extended use were 
considered as possible ways to save FFR supplies. Concerns about the safety of 
such policies were debated. It was speculated that reuse could lead to self-
inoculation, transmission to a patient, or contamination of other surfaces such as 
doorknobs, bedrails, and computers, which could then be picked up by other HCWs 
or patients.
• And finally, researchers and epidemiologists may be able to use derivatives of the 
model to characterize contamination levels in hospitals based on the level of 
facemask contamination (for example, by solving for Cout with use of measured 
values for Cfa). It may be possible that facemasks, collected from HCWs and 
analyzed for the presence of influenza, could provide information about the 
concentrations of influenza within a healthcare facility and could be used to 
compare contamination levels on the basis of location within the facility, procedure 
conducted by the HCW while wearing the facemask, job description, or other 
aspects of the HCWs and healthcare facilities.
5. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES
The application of the models to estimate facemask contamination is not without limitations. 
The cough model was not validated by laboratory studies. The aerosol and cough models do 
not reflect all aspects affecting facemask contamination in the healthcare environment, such 
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as aerosol concentration variability (resulting from an aerosol-generating procedure or 
application of some method of source control, for instance), virus viability, user-generated 
virus particles, or contact contamination from touching the facemask with contaminated 
gloves or hands. The model does not consider the additive nature of simultaneous direct-
spray and aerosol contamination. The model was not validated with data from an actual 
healthcare facility or with other infectious aerosols. Data for model inputs were limited and 
may not accurately depict the typical conditions seen in all healthcare facilities.
In the future, we will be analyzing the risks associated with reusing a contaminated 
facemask and will consider other factors such as virus viability, transfer efficiency, and 
transport to the targeted cells of the respiratory tract. For example, an estimate of viable 
virus captured on the facemask at the end of a given facemask wearing period could be 
calculated using the equation , where constant capture rate of 
infectious virus is denoted as I, first-order loss of infectivity is α, and facemask wear 
duration as t.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, models were used to estimate facemask influenza contamination levels via 
aerosol deposition for three scenarios and deposition via direct spray (cough). These models 
suggest that influenza contamination levels from a single cough are much less than 
contamination levels from aerosol sources. Even for aerosol contamination, wide variation 
was found in estimated facemask contamination levels, depending on the input values 
selected. Overall, these models and the estimates for facemask contamination levels can be 
used to inform current infection control practice and future research related to the 
development of better facemasks, to characterize airborne contamination levels, and to assist 
in the assessment of risk from reaerosolization and fomite transfer from the handling and 
reuse of contaminated facemasks.
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Correlation between model predicted contamination and laboratory measured facemask 
contamination. The squares represent data points for N95 FFRs coupons. The triangles 
represent data for SMs coupons. Sealed and unsealed configurations of face-mask 
attachment to the headform are represented as black and white symbols, respectively.
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Table I
List of Model Parameters
Parameter Description Units
Afm Area of the facemask cm2
Cfa Contamination on the facemask from aerosol exposure Virus/facemask
Cfc Contamination on the facemask from a cough Virus/facemask
Cin Concentration of particles inside the facemask Virus/m3
Cout Aerosols concentration of virus in the environment (outside of facemask) Virus/m3
AC Area of a cough cm2
Eb Barrier efficiency of the facemask –
IRa Inhalation rate of facemask user m3/hour
t Duration of facemask use Hour
Vc Viruses in a cough Viruses
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